ABSTRACT In this paper we estimate empirically a prospective type of welfare regime for Ukraine through testing the correspondence between ideal types of welfare regimes and mass attitudes to state support of individual well-being. In accordance with G.Esping-Andersen's classification (1990), we consider three types of welfare regimes which have their historical bases in Europe and use the examples of three European countries as empirical referents for comparative analysis. The analysis of social attitudes to welfare regimes is based on data from ESS Round 4 (2008 and is done in a three-dimension space of social expectations, assessments, and estimations of state social support for individual welfare. The comparison of social attitudes to state support for individual well-being in Ukraine and in three selected European countries allows us to come to a conclusion about the possibility of welfare reforms in Ukraine that would move it towards having one of the ideal types of European welfare regimes. Using a linear regression model we test the influence of institutional, cultural and structural factors on individual expectations about the social responsibility of a state. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the 'three welfare regimes' theoretical model accurately describes differences in social attitudes between West European countries like Great Britain, Germany and Sweden. However, as was expected from a theoretical perspective the empirical profiles of social attitudes towards welfare regimes in the post-Socialist countries contain substantial mismatches. The research outcomes highlight the currently very unsteady process of welfare development in different types of European societies. Post-Socialist states as a whole, and post-Soviet states especially, are unique 'worlds' of welfare attitudes in wider Europe.
INTRODUCTION
At the threshold of the 21st century European societies were challenged by societal transformations, the collapse of former state socialism and crises of capitalism. These processes sparked the emergence of new forms of inequalities, mass protests, institutional changes and the growth of mass discontent with the state and social regulation policy. Neoliberalism spread across the world with its attendant ideas of the market regulation of social wellbeing and the interconnected concepts of 'welfare state', 'social state' and 'good society' were ejected out of mainstream intellectual, scientific and public debate. The 'ejection' of the issues and the corresponding concepts happened in parallel with the deep crises in welfare state practices (Svallfors 2003; Esping-Andersen 2006; Pierson 2001), viz.: -the 'warping' of the market as a result of a cost-based welfare state. This 'strangled' the market through its requirement for a level of taxation high enough to ensure the maintenance of social programs, as well as a decrease in labor motivation and various stimuli designed to increase capital accumulation and investment; -the long-term effects on the welfare state sparked by the aging of the population; these effects are connected to increases in the financial load that working people and social infrastructure as a whole must bear; -the undermining of traditional models of social solidarity; changes in family values; -challenges to the new global economy in terms of ineffective governance and noncompetitive economies; -technological displacement of the middle class under the current economic crisis.
However, no later than at the end of the first decade of the 2000s under the new global economic crisis the pendulum of public and academic attention started to shift back in the opposite direction; viz. to strengthening the role of the state in regulating numerous social issues. In 2009, at the suggestion of the president of Kirgizstan, the United Nations General Assembly created an annual World Day for Social Justice. In the special resolution of the UN the following items were specified as necessary: eliminating poverty, guaranteeing full employment, ensuring the provision of worthwhile and meaningful jobs, welfare and social justice for all people, and equal rights for men and women. One of the most influential sociologists of the time -Randal Collins (2010: 30) -in his plenary paper at the conference in 2009 (devoted to a centenary of the Sociological Review journal) justified the idea that the Keynesian model of the welfare state should be bought back into current social policy, which would, in Collin's mind, provide an escape from the deadlock of the current crisis of capitalist states.
The financial and economic crisis has since 2008 caused a destructive effect on the middle classes (through inflation and the closure of credit programs, a slump in the financing of education and science etc.) as well as on the different vulnerable groups (through inflation, the growth of unemployment and the elimination or scaling down of social programs). The crisis stimulated mass protests across the world. As a result, old and new elaborations of welfare state theories come again into the focus of public and academic interest and discussions. What kind of welfare state regime would be more successful in times of crisis and in a rapidly-changing world? What methods and indices of the state regulation of social risks and individual wellbeing would be more effective? Many scientists and politicians claim to have fixed the problems with the welfare state and to have contributed to renewing the discussion concerning both welfare policy prospects and the role of the state in supporting individual welfare. But debates on these issues have not yet ceased.
Though the origin of the welfare state is dated to the late 1800s, the welfare regimes developed as "the heart of the institutional structure of all European societies" (Bable 2011: 571) came into being just after WWII. According to EuroStata data, if in 1960 the median level of social outlay under Western capitalism was 10 percent of GDP, by 2011 expenditure on social protection in the Euro Area-17 had risen to 30 percent of GDP, and in EU-28 was 29.1. However, this median level masks substantial variation among EU countries, ranging from 16-17 percent of GDP in Estonia and Bulgaria to more than 33-34 percent in France and Denmark.
A diversity of welfare regimes were formed on the bases of national varieties of social insurance and redistribution systems. The regimes were developed as "a collective piggy bank designed to insure against social risks" (Barr 2001) -such as individual risks to life, intergenerational risks, and class risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 40-43) . They all have three main components: (1) a system of various forms of publicly-supported social insurance that are designed to deal with a range of individual personal risks (like infirmity in old age, or disadvantages caused by social origin/status); (2) a state-funded tax regime sufficient to purchase a fairly expansive set of public goods; (3) a regulatory regime for the economy that restricts the negative externalities caused by markets (unemployment, marginalization, decreases in earnings, etc.) .
The development of Western welfare regimes after WWII was some kind of a response to state socialism with its social policy of mass protection and, at least, the effect of a "positive class compromise" (E. O. Wright, 2012) between the capitalist class and popular social forces. The socialist welfare regimes were formed as the principal feature of state socialism. They were unique in some ways and left a unique legacy for post-Socialist governments. During state-socialism, well-developed patronage systems of wide social security were created; however, these were strongly coupled to employment status, sometimes even more tightly than with the typical social insurance systems of Western European countries (Therborn 1995) . The appropriate institutional systems were embedded into the socialist states, affecting everyday social life. State enterprises, as a rule, became centers of welfare provision, especially social and medical services. According to B. Deacon, the social policies under state Socialism were characterized by "heavily subsidized foods and rents, full employment, the relatively high wages of workers, and the provision of free or cheap health, education and cultural services" (Deacon 2002) . The welfare institutions were formed in a strictly centralized economy with limited financial resources. Consequently, there was exclusive standardization, an extremely low quality of services, and coverage of only a small segment of the population in need (Boutenko, 1997: 145) . Despite this, for several decades of life under state socialism individuals used to enjoy a guarantee of full employment, social insurance (based on employment, or more narrowly, on occupation), subsided public goods and services, a developed system of social infrastructure and assistance from state enterprises. People got accustomed to relying on the state to insure them against multiple social risks. The patronage approach in welfare usually divides individual interests along the lines of clientele. Public-opinion polls bear this out, showing that the citizens of post-socialist countries (much like their West European neighbors) expect the state to play a greater role in the economy and the provision of social goods than do the inhabitants of developing countries (Boutenko, 1997) . According to G. Therborn (1995: 89-97) , this kind of social welfare regime led to an occupationally-fragmented system of particular social rights, in contrast to the other variations of regimes that are based mostly on social assistance and usually tend towards having a general system of universal social rights, such as those that became more developed in different forms in Western Europe.
Although the social-democratic path of welfare development after the collapse of state socialism was arguably the most suitable path for the postsocialist states to follow, the social-democratic welfare model held no appeal to post-Socialist states. Instead, in the 1990s these states drew primarily from their conservative pasts and the liberal policies advocated by the Washington Consensus (Inglor, 2008; Fenger, 2007) .
According to International Labor Organization data, public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in post-Soviet states by 2000 had been reduced in the Russian Federation (for example) to 8.7%, and in Ukraine to 13.6%. During the first decade of the 2000s the situation with the social outlays in these countries did not change significantly: in 2011 the level of social expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Russia was 12.0%, and in Ukraine was 13.6%. After the collapse of state socialism, under rapid institutional changes, market transition and the disruption of the state-guaranteed system of employment and corresponding social insurance (based on employment), the previous welfare socialist regimes collapsed. People faced high levels of uncertainty and insecurity, and experienced psychological trauma (as noted by P. Sztompka). Some of the post-Socialist states were inclined towards partially renovating the occupational insurance system using the European Continental welfare regimes as a template. This allowed some researchers to term these newly-existing welfare models 'post-communist conservative corporatist' models (Deacon 2002) . At the same time, in 1996 and later in 2002, G.Esping-Andersen rejected the idea of the emergence of a new type of welfare regime under post-socialism. He suggested that the differences between these countries and three specific European welfare regimes, the existence of which he defined, 'were only of a transitional nature' (EspingAndersen, 1996) . These emerging regimes, as he concluded later, were influenced by models presented by the World Bank (Esping-Andersen, 2002 ). This conclusion was confirmed by M. Sengoku (2009) using an institutionoriented approach. But Sengoku also noted that, in post-socialist countries, external drivers only functioned as catalysts. H.J.M. Fenger, in his study into the possibility of incorporating the post-socialist states into the typology of welfare regimes (Fenger, 2007) , made an important conclusion about the large differences between post-Communist and Western welfare states, which the author claims are greater than the differences between the countries within any of those groups. This indicates the appearance of a specific post-communist type of welfare regime which is internally heterogeneous but which differs from all other European regimes across the parameters of level of trust, nature of social programs and the social situation in the post-communist countries.
However, up to now the creation of an appropriate welfare regime has not been finalized in post-Socialist countries such as Ukraine, the Russian Federation, etc. Furthermore, it is not clear how the regimes will develop. This is why estimating the chance of a welfare regime of a certain type developing in a country, as well as placement of the post-socialist states in the welfare regime typology, remains an urgent research task.
Two main approaches to the development of welfare state models can be recognized. We associate these approaches with so-called 'strong' and 'weak' programs. Within the weak program the justification of the selection of a welfare solution is grounded on some kind of normative orientation, or the best empirical pattern which functions successfully in a certain state. As a rule, such orientations reflect subjectively and ideologically-based ideas about the better social order. Implementation of this normative model as a real policy objective and its further development depends principally on legitimizing the model through mass acceptance; or, in other words, fitting the model to mass expectations and cultural orientations. Social processes are shaped by culture, social structure and the social actions of individuals and groups. Policies and regimes which are policy-supported but 'unrooted' in society may be rejected through mass dissatisfaction and protests. Thus the forced adaptation of any normative model of a policy on society can lead to unexpected outcomes such as social parasitism, alienation and a decline in the trust of social and political institutes.
In contrast to the logic of the 'weak program' (and populist declarations about the need for normative-oriented welfare reforms), the 'strong program' of welfare policy-making is based on empirical evaluations of the capability of a society to adopt to a certain welfare model. Accordingly, with a 'strong program' orientation the choice of the better welfare regime not only concerns identifying the better institutional norms and rules for the state regulation of individual wellbeing. The embedding or adaptability of any institutional regime essentially depends on its mass support, or on the correspondence between institutional rules and mass expectations. As a result, in order to identify the more appropriate welfare regime for a society we need to evaluate popular expectations concerning the state regulation of individual wellbeing. In this paper we empirically ground a prospective type of welfare regime for Ukraine through testing the correspondence between mass attitudes to state support of individual wellbeing and ideal types of welfare regimes. In accordance with G.EspingAndersen's classification (1990), we consider three types of welfare state, which have their historical foundations in Europe, and we use the examples of three European countries where these types were historically developed. By comparing mass attitudes to the state support of individual wellbeing in Ukraine and in three selected European countries, we attempt to derive a conclusion about the possibility of welfare reform occurring in Ukraine towards the ideal types of European welfare regime.
Our research is based on a database derived from the 4th wave of the 
RESEARCH GOALS
In this paper we make an empirically-based estimation of social expectations concerning the welfare state in Ukraine compared with Western (i.e. countries with well-developed markets and welfare traditions) and Eastern (i.e. postsocialist) European societies. This intention is framed in the following research goals:
1. specifying the basic empirical features of three welfare regimes in European societies and defining the empirical referents of welfare regimes in Europe. For comparative cross-national analysis and on the basis of the advanced Esping-Andersen's welfare regime typology (Ebbinghaus 2012: 14) , we selected three countries as referents. These represent more strongly the main welfare capitalism regimes; namely, Great Britain with its liberal (more market and individualistic) model; Sweden with a social-democratic ('solidarian') model; and Germany with a continental ('Christian-Democratic', more subsidiary) model of welfare. Poland and the Russian Federation as well as Ukraine will be included in the comparison as representatives of the post-Socialist Eastern European states with newly-emerging welfare models; 2. owing to the fact that there is no knowledge about the normative levels of social attitudes to welfare regimes which could provide for their legitimation and successful implementation, we use a comparative method for further analysis. Application of a comparative method allows us to define the differences in social attitudes which reflect the differences between empirical welfare regimes and their successes. If we can identify through our empirical analysis a set of theoretically-estimated patterns of social attitudes to welfare regimes, this will be a weighty argument in favor of the selected variables and can serve to describe the basic features of the welfare patterns. 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUAL WELLBEING IN A SOCIETY?
The concept of the welfare state corresponds closely to a wider concept of social responsibility which has a sociological sense and recently has been adapted from the new economics of business (McBarnet & Campbell 2007) to contemporary theories of civil society and 'social state'. Interpreting the welfare state through bringing a sense of social responsibility into the conceptual frame will allow us to depart from the strictly instrumental features of the concept (usually defined as a combination of social insurance, market regulation policy and a tax regime) and to outline the principal dimensions of a welfare state, its historical roots, and its embedding into a triangle of interrelations between family, state and society. It is natural that the activities of a state and public policy strongly affect society, the standard of living of communities and the family and health status of individuals, as well as their social involvement. However, in respect to the interrelations of a state with a family or individuals, and in terms of responsibility for a family's welfare, a state can have different kinds of relationships: from a laissez-faire position of non-interference into families' lives ('an individual or a family is responsible for their own life/s') to a position of active interference, control and regulation of individual\family welfare ('the state is responsible for individual wellbeing'). In this set of variations in interpretation the social responsibility of a state appears as a kind of relationship between a state and families or individuals which corresponds to the obligation of a state to act to benefit society at large and individual wellbeing, as well as in how a state assists and deals with different social issues, has concern for living standards and acts in relation to the social inclusion of individuals and preservation of the social solidarity that exists in society.
Some recent studies into the social development and responsibility of a state have contributed in different ways to the theoretical interpretation of welfare. The basic contemporary notions which have enriched the conception are summed up in:
-the 'good society' approach in the neo-Kantian tradition, established in the 1960s-70s by Rawls and Habermas and later developed in the 'binary discourse' into universalism or communitarianism vs. particularism as modes of the good society development and the achievement of social wellbeing. The sociological communitarian version of the good society, developed by A. Etzioni (1996) , and the 'moral civil society' vision by J. Alexander (2000; 2006) have their focus on the moral quality of a community (Etzioni) or on citizenship (J. Alexander), and on morality and solidarity in explaining the main sources of individual wellbeing and civil society efficacy. On the basis of research into the long-term survival and more or less effective enclave economies that were developed by ethnic migrants, A. Portes (1987) involves the concepts of 'bonded solidarities' and 'civil engagement' in interpreting the successfulness of the corresponding community. The value of a web of crisscrossing affective social bonds, and the moral quality of values and mores in interpreting community and citizenship as foundations for individual wellbeing are the basic components in the triangle of relationships between the individual, state, and society; -an institutional and political-economy approach, recently by the 'New Constitutionalists' such as W.Anderson, St.L.Elkin, Ph.Green, etc. (Soltan & Elkin 1996; Elkin & Soltan 1999, etc.) , and by G.Esping-Andersen (2002), which underlines the significance of 'citizen competences' (as it is interpreted by the 'Constitutionalists') and the role of 'good', norm-oriented institutional design in developing an efficient democratic citizenship, as well as a welfare state; -the 'community-driven development' and 'social accountability' approach, widely promoted via World Bank reports since 2004, underlines the idea of the significance of citizen involvement (the critical point for enhancing democratic governance) in improving service delivery; the ability of citizens, civil society organizations and other non-state actors to hold the state accountable (Ellison 1997; Carnwall and Gaventa 2000; and make it responsive to their needs. The "Demands for Good Governance' (The World Bank Report 2013) principles are designed to strengthen the capacity of NGOs, local communities and the private sector so they can hold the state (authorities) accountable for creating higher levels of wellbeing. The interpretation of the welfare state on this theoretical basis is focused on demand-driven mechanisms which are operated from the bottom-up and create the social accountability of the state (authority and decision-making). Social accountability can play an important role in the development of collaboration between the state (government) and civil society and help public institutions to meet the expectations of society; -the 'assets and сapability approach' developed by A. Sen (1999; emphasizes a notion of universal human rights in evaluating various states with regard to justice; it recognizes that formal and informal institutions can facilitate or constrain efforts to secure people against poverty and social exclusion. Based on a person-centered institutional interpretation, Sen not only emphasizes the importance of assets but draws attention to their returns -or how those assets translate into improved wellbeing for poor people. To ensure those returns, institutions must allow assets to be used productively and freely, promoting, in a term used by Sen, 'capabilities'. The current development of the re-interpretation of social responsibility and the set of potential welfare regimes are oriented around the theoretical ideas mentioned above.
The historically-based responses to the challenge of who takes responsibility for an individual's or family's wellbeing rest on the three pillars, between which responsibility is shared: state (governance), communities (civil society), and the individual (family), with his (its) market competitiveness. Subject to the accent that is placed on one of the 'pillars', empirical models of responsibility for welfare and corresponding welfare regimes have been developed between the following extremes. First, the laissez-faire approach, resulting in rudimentary models of the welfare state with undeveloped legal rights for citizens in terms of social security and public assistance; the individual good depends on the market forces and becomes a primary concern of individuals, their family and different communities. Second, the totalitarian models of public control designed to engender a certain standard of wellbeing that is firmed and secured by the state without the influence of the market, as in the model of state socialism in the former USSR.
G. Esping-Andersen (1990; , Svallfors (2003) developed the concept of welfare regimes making the stress on the 'systemness' of institutional arrangements and analytically defined three basic models manifesting themselves within the market economy, wiz.: (i) the 'liberal' welfare model; (ii) the Scandinavian welfare model; and, (iii) the continental European welfare model. All of these models are embedded into capitalism (with liberalism or social democracy), but not all of them have an equalizing effect because social insurance has often focused on income security rather than equality. Now all these models face challenges from the crisis of capitalism as well as the impact of emergencies of the welfare state per se (Kaufmann 2010). All these models are developing towards adaptation the new challenges of social contracts between a state and the different generations as well as the vulnerable social groups. The updating models are more oriented on social inclusion and cohesion policy via employment and the generational contract. The former socialist welfare states, under the impact of liberal democratization and free market capitalism, and after the dismantling of their previously-strong social patronage institutions, have partly kept or revived their old traditions of social insurance, as well as partly recreating new forms of social protection. After the breakdown of state socialism-driven systems, the post-Soviet countries did not follow the Scandinavian road to universalism but rather the Continental method of introducing occupational social insurance. At the end of 2010, welfare policy in post-soviet countries is even more employment-related than in Western Europe (Inglor 2008; Bable 2010: 576) . As a result, according to Th.Bable, J.Kohl, and Cl.Wendt, the new 'layered' complex welfare systems in Eastern European countries do not easily fit into the typologies developed on the basis of 'varieties across Western Europe ' (2010: 580) . However, there have been few quantitative analyses of advanced welfare regimes (including the post-Soviet countries), partly due to their situations as transforming states (Abrahamson 2010) as well as to the absence of good national-level statistical data. Despite the scale of challenges to welfare state, the majority of comparative, institutional and sociologically oriented studies have flagged up various degrees of change such as the recalibration, recasting, renewing or reforming of welfare states, but have concluded that these changes have led to the survival of the welfare state (Clegg, 2007; Drahoukoupil, 2007; Castels and Obinger, 2008) . The outcomes of two-decades of research into welfare systems by different researchers allows us to assert that the 'regime-typology' approach in comparative analysis remains useful for conceptualizing the differences between welfare states, as well as classifying the empirical similarities between them, taking into account national historical legacies. However, the conceptualization of empirical variations of welfare regimes needs further development with the inclusion of the post-Soviet welfare cases and cultural parameters such as social attitudes and expectations.
MACRO-LEVEL PARAMETERS OF THE SELECTED COUNTRIES
The selected countries differ significantly in terms of quality of life (see Table 1 3 ) and social expenditure of the state (see Table 2 ). Components of life quality define the risk to individual wellbeing and thus can be used to support identification of the preconditions of social attitudes to the welfare state, to social protection and to the need for social assistance. According to the indicators of quality of life, Ukraine ranks lowest in the set of countries under comparison, with the exception of life expectancy, the Gini index and social expenditure, which are lower in Russia. Russian society in 2007 was more polarized and had less welfare than Ukraine. There is significant difference between life expectancy, HDI and GNI per capita between the postSocialist countries and the Western European countries selected for analysis. Some positive trends in the social-economic development of post-Socialist societies in the first decade of the 2000s (decreases in absolute poverty, as well as increases in life expectancy) have not remarkably impacted overall quality of life in a cross-national perspective. Moreover, in the 2000s the tendency towards the aging of the population sped up and was attended by an increase in the emigration of more educated youth from post-Socialist countries. These structural features increase the social risk to individual wellbeing which is felt by citizens; they impact social demands and public expectations of the state.
In relation to state responsibility, we distinguished three referent models -a 'liberal', a 'social-democratic', and a 'continental' model. We investigated the fitness of these models for describing society and examined how legitimate they are.
Each of the models differs from the other in terms of state social responsibility: from less responsibility in the 'liberal' model to a penetrating level of responsibility in the 'social-democracy' model. However, state penetration into a society and private individual' or families' life can bring both positive and negative social effects. The likely positive effects are decreases in social tension in society, poverty and social inequality. At the same time, negative effects can arise due to the huge social commitments of a state which impact the economy, slowing down economic growth and weakening social ties and solidarity in a society, as well as decreasing an individual's responsibility for their own (and their family's) wellbeing.
We analyze social attitudes to the welfare state in a three-dimensional space of: (1) individual and class-based expectations about the state's capacity for social protection, or the social responsibility of a state; (2) a social assessment of the utility of the welfare state; and, (3) social estimations of the risks to social development of a welfare regime.
It is assumed that the inclination of citizens for a 'social-democracy' model will be characterized by expectations for strong state social assistance and a presumption of the high utility of the welfare state in combination with the expectation that there is only a small risk that the welfare state will negatively impact the development of society. In contrast to this case, it is supposed that the inclination of citizens towards a 'liberal' model will appear in mass desire for a weak form of state social assistance (due to the prevailing idea that social responsibility means citizens taking responsibility for their own wellbeing and that of their families), as well as of the weak utility of the welfare state, alongside presumptions that a welfare state presents a high risk in terms of its negative impact on social development. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the supporters of a 'continental' model will have moderate expectations concerning the welfare state and its utility and assume it will have modest negative social consequences. It is moreover supposed that such an assessment of the utility and risk of a welfare state can explain strongly expectations about the social responsibility of a state. The generalized expected profiles of commitment to these three basic welfare state models are presented in Table 3 . The symbols "+" and "-" designate theoretically-expected (relative) expressions of strong attitudes ("+"), and weak attitudes ("-").
These theoretically-expected profiles were tested on empirical data about mass attitudes in six European countries. This procedure allowed us also to define empirically the location for each country under scrutiny along the dimensions of three basic models. We assume that the countries with well-developed market capitalism and a long-term history of a welfare state regime will display the criteria described in the corresponding model of mass disposition as measured by social attitudes and expectations. The analysis of the profiles of post-socialist countries with institutionally changed welfare states, the reform of which are still in progress, allow us to outline the inclination of a society towards a specified welfare model. The conversion in our analysis from generalized indices (or aggregated data) measured at a country level to group-level analysis (at a social class, gender, age etc. level, or at the individual level) will allow us to define the factors that influence the inclination of citizens towards a certain welfare regime.
SOCIAL ATTITUDES TO WELFARE REGIME: SOME FINDINGS FROM COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
The questionnaire used in the ESS-4 (2008-09) contains a module designed to measure public desire for state assistance in relation to the following social issues: health protection, employment security, support of a family and elderly people (questions D15-D204). The questions and indicators correspond with the main dimensions of a welfare state. In order to calculate an additive index on the basis of the indicators mentioned above, a onefactor solution (using principal component analysis) was created for each country under scrutiny. The one-factor solution for each country ranges from explaining 47% of the variation for Great Britain to 57% for Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This is an important finding that supports the validity of the one-dimensional concept 'social expectation of a social responsibility of a state'. The appropriate additive index, calculated as the mean of variables D15-D20, strongly correlates with the one-factor solution (r > 0.9 for every country). For the pooled data of six countries the one-factor solution explains 55% of general variation and also strongly correlates with the appropriate additive index (r = 0.996). The reliability coefficient Cronbach's a, which characterizes the internal consistency of the additive index, is rather high for each country and varies from 0.76 (for Great Britain) to 0.84 (for Ukraine), and is 0.83 for the pooled data. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, an index of citizens' expectations about the social responsibility of a state (named StatResp) was calculated as a mean of the variables D15-D20. The index varies from 0 to 10, where '0' means the public expectation that the state will not interfere in either individual or family wellbeing (the minimum social responsibility of a state), and '10' means the opposite -the full (maximum) social responsibility of a state. The index's means are compared for all six countries under study. in values that allow us to consider this index to be a good measure of the key subjective characteristics ('estimation of social responsibility of governance') of the empirical welfare state models. Accordingly, this index can be used as a dependent variable for further analysis. The means for the six countries are presented in Table 4 . In line with theoretical expectations, Swedish society with its 'socialdemocratic' model of welfare state manifests higher social expectations than British society with its 'liberal' model. The differences in means are significant at p < 0.05. The difference between index means for Germany (the 'continental' model) and for Great Britain is not significant (at p = 0.05); that is, is not consistent with theoretical expectations (see Table 3 ). Poland, according to this index of social expectations, inclines towards the 'socialdemocratic' model (the difference in mean values for Poland and Sweden is not significant at p = 0.05). The highest social expectations can be observed in the Ukrainian and Russian data and can be explained by the strong claim for social assistance from states which were formed under state socialism. Let us note that the mean of the index in Ukraine is significantly higher than in Russia, but even in Russia's case the mean of the index is higher than for the other countries under study. The question now follows: what factors influence social expectations (at the individual level)?
We constructed a further two indices, viz. an index of the utility of a welfare state and an index of the social risk presented by a welfare state on the basis of questions D21-D29 5 of the survey questionnaire. The two-factor solutions (principal component analysis) for each countries' data have very similar structures and interpretations and explain a similar amount of variance. The second factor may clearly be interpreted as an assessment of the utility of a CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (2014) welfare state and the first one should be understood as an estimation of the social risk that arises from the welfare state (on the development of society). In order to supply the further cross-national comparison, the final factor analysis was done on pooled (six country) data. The two-factor solution allows the same clear interpretation and explains 62% of general variation (see Table 5 ). The estimated factor values were linearly transformed, allowing us to create the following two indices: an index of the assessment of the utility of a welfare state (BenfSS) and an index of the estimation of the social risk that a welfare state presents (RiskSS). Both indices vary from '0' (minimum assessment of utility as well as minimum estimation of social risks) to '10' (maximum estimation). The means of three indices for the countries under study are presented in Table 6 . According to the data in Table 6 , the ratio of mean values of the indices of the utility and social risks of welfare state for Great Britain, Germany and Sweden fully correspond to theoretical expectations (see Table 3 ). In Great Britain (the 'liberal' model), compared with the other countries under study, individuals estimate social risks to be highest (or, in other words, display the highest level of fear concerning the negative consequences on social development of a welfare state) as well as the lowest assessment of the utility of public social programs. The Swedish data (the 'social-democratic' model), in contrast, includes the highest assessment of the utility of a welfare state and the lowest estimation of social risks. The consistency of the empirical profiles of the welfare regimes of these three countries supports the validity of the specified three-dimensional space of social attitudes towards welfare regimes.
Comparison of Western and Eastern European countries brings up some rather unexpected findings. The greatest (relative to other countries') desire for the welfare state in post-Socialist Ukraine and Russia is combined with the lowest assessment of the utility of the welfare state, as well as with the lowest estimation of social risk. In summary, assessments and estimations both in Ukraine and Russia do not correspond to any of three basic welfare regimes. As a result, this evidence only partially confirms the typologies of welfare regimes elaborated by Fenger (2007) and Ebbinghaus (2012) with the institutional-oriented approach. So, if institutionally the welfare regime in Poland is a closer fit to the 'continental' regime of Germany (for example), the composition of relevant social attitudes and expectations is closer to a 'social-democratic' model. As a consequence for policy development it appears that attempts to implement any of the models which were historically developed and rooted in Western Europe will not find social support in postSoviet societies, and such social policies will probably be ineffective.
What determines social attitudes to welfare regimes?
Why do different societies demonstrate such diverse attitudes to the welfare state and desires about the social responsibility of a state to act to secure an individual and the family's wellbeing? Or rather, what factors (at the individual level of analysis) influence such attitudes?
The index of expectations about the social responsibility of governance (StateResp, as described earlier) is used as a dependent variable in the regression model. It introduced (see Table 5 ) two orthogonal (uncorrelated) indices -an index of the assessment of the utility of the welfare state (BenfSS) and an index of the estimation of the social risk of a welfare state (RiskSS), which both describe well the differences between empirical welfare state models (represented in the social consciousness of citizens), and which both can influence significantly social attitudes to the welfare state.
We assume that social attitudes to a welfare regime and to the social responsibility of a state are a complex function of the institutional, cultural and structural parameters of the social interaction of individuals with a state and its institutions. As Shalev (2001) has put it, the argument is that welfare regimes should be seen as a limited number of qualitatively-different configurations with distinctive historical roots. Real long-term social policy and politics can affect strongly citizens' social attitudes, expectations and assessments of a state; on the other hand, perceptions and expectations about the social responsibility of a state can differ according to social group and classes that have diverse access to resources that are unequally distributed across a society. On the basis of this reasoning in our explanatory model we include variables (illustrated in Table 7 ) that describe the factors which potentially determine citizens' expectations about the social responsibility of the state for individual and family wellbeing.
The complex effect of the interaction between individuals and welfare regimes is subjectively represented in individual experience. This 'effect' can be measured using four parameters: (1) a personal assessment of the utility of a welfare state (BenfSS index); (2) estimation of the social risks of a welfare state (RiskSS index); (3) personal evaluation of the national social system (SSEval additive index); and, (4) personal trust in public institutions (Trust additive index).
The second potential group of factors contains an ideological and cultural dimension of social attitudes towards a welfare regime, presented at an individual level. In the analyses we use only one additive variable to measure attitudes to social justice supported by the state (Equality).
The third group of factors presents the parameters relevant to social structure. We take into account in our analysis that there is substantial evidence that social cleavages drive the politics of welfare state reform. As C.de la Porte and K. Jacobsson (2012) note, different national patterns are embedded in social policy and help to shape distinct national varieties of capitalism with appropriate social structures. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism, one can expect that employers' attitudes toward welfare state will be complex. This helps to explain why employers have often been more halfhearted and internally-divided over policy reform than many political economy theories anticipate (Shalev 2001) . Highlighting the connections between social policy arrangements and socio-structural change, or the variety of cross-cutting lines of social conflict that emerge during the transition to a post-industrial or market economy (in the case of post-Socialist countries), allows for greater precision in identifying the social legitimizing of the welfare state that can generate the greatest discontent about welfare policy and its efficacy. We test two structural-sensitive models for explaining the social expectations of citizens -one based on taking into consideration social class cleavages (between employers and employees, for example -see the variable Employer in Table 7) , and the other structural parameters such as gender, age, education, type of residence and personal social network (see Table 7 ). One of the questions that we are interested in answering is how influential social class cleavage is in explaining expectations for social responsibility in different welfare models. 
Trust
-trust in public institutions; index is constructed as mean of B4-B8 and varies from 0 (no trust) to 10 (high level of trust); Cronbach's alpha is about 0.9 How much do you personally trust each of the following institutions… (0 means "do not trust an institution at all" and 10 means "complete trust") B4 …country's parliament? B5 …the legal system? B6 …the police? B7 …politicians? B8 …political parties?
Individual values of equality and social justice
Equality -attitude to social justice supported by a state; single factor solution for B30 D1 D4, six countries' pooled data, principal component analysis, 54% of variance B30. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels D1. Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts. D4. For a society to be fair, differences in people's standard of living should be small (1 means «agree strongly» and 5 means «disagree strongly»)
Social structure belonging
Employer -class cleavage under capitalism; dichotomous variable that identifies a select group of employers ('capitalists', 'small employers' and 'skilled managers' according to the class scheme by E.O.Wright) defined in opposition to 'employees'.
EmplType
-type of employability; dichotomous variable that identifies a select group of employees (=1) in contrast to those who have their own business or who are self-employed; calculated on F12, dichotomous variable Gender -dichotomous variable that selects men (=1) ag_25 -dichotomous variable that selects people of 18-25 years old (=1); selection of this age group was done on the basis of empirical calculations of the significance of different age groups in the linear model Educ -education; the number of years that a respondent has spent in full-time education City -dichotomous variable that select residents of cities and suburbs (=1) LowInc -dichotomous variable on F32 that selects families with low incomes (first three deciles of family income in the country = 1)
Reciprocity
-availability of social support from surrounding people (as an indicator of personal social network); F34. If you were in serious financial difficulties and had to borrow money to make ends meet, how difficult or easy would that be?
(1 means «very difficult» and 5 means «very easy»)
The mean values of the key institutional and culturally-sensitive parameters for six countries selected for modeling are presented in Table 8 . The data illustrates the significant differences between countries with Western European welfare state regimes and post-Socialist states, including Poland, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In particular, in Ukraine and in Russia the high level of expectations of social support (StatResp) and the high level of support for income redistribution by the state to foster greater material equality between citizens (Equality) are combined both with a low estimate of the risk of the negative effects of social benefits and services that are provided by a state to the economy, and to morality in a society (RiskSS) and with a low estimate of the state utility of social support (BenfSS) as well as with a low appraisal of the effectiveness of the social system in general (SSEval). This mismatch in Ukraine corresponds to the extremely low level of trust in public institutions (Trust). The mismatch in the social attitudes in post-Soviet societies is evidence of the catastrophic shortage of the state in the social sphere during the market transition which resulted in a mass negative experience of the interaction between individuals and the state. The long-term negative social experience led to mass discontent with the state and the public's alienation from it.
Below, two regression models are described which estimate the influence of different potential factors (see Table 7 ) on the level of expectation for the social responsibility of governance. The first model includes the variable Employer that was introduced into the model to facilitate investigation of any class cleavage between employers and employees (see Table 9 ). According to the class-specific model for all six countries, the strongest factor is the culturally and ideologically based variable 'individual attitudes towards social justice' (Equality), which corresponds with the redistribution policy of a state. It is interesting that this factor has more influence in West European societies with different welfare regimes (as well as in Poland) than in post-Soviet countries (especially Ukraine). This finding matches the general conclusion, recently stated by Swallfors and Kulin (2012) , that "the links between values and attitudes are generally stronger in more materially secure and privileged classes [and societies]. However, the relative strength of the associations varies substantially across countries. Where inequality is smaller and poverty less prevalent, the link between values and attitudes becomes less class-specific".
A negative assessment of the risk of a welfare state (or negative perceptions about the likely provision of social benefits and services to the economy and morality in a society) -RiskSS -is significant in all countries, but the most influence this factor has in the post-Soviet countries. At the same time, the effect of trust on public institutions (Trust) is much smaller and is significant only in three countries -Ukraine, Great Britain and the Russian Federation. It is interesting that in Ukraine, in contrast to Great Britain and the Russian Federation, the influence of Trust is negative. Concerning class cleavage (Employer), this has a weak effect on expectations about the social responsibility of governance only in Ukraine, Great Britain and Poland: employees have higher expectations about the social responsibility of governance than employers. But in Germany and Sweden, with their stronger social-democratic welfare regimes, the influence of a class cleavage is not significant. In the Russian Federation the link between the class variable and expectations for socially responsible governance are not significant, but tend to be positive. This may be interpreted in terms of their undeveloped social contracts.
The other ('structural') explanatory model also includes institutional and cultural factors and is oriented at a wider set of social structure factors, excluding social class. The replacing of the factor 'class cleavage' with another set of social structural factors (age, gender, education, income stratification, type of residence and social network) does not significantly increase the explanatory power of the model (see Table 10 ). The basic structure of the influence of the institutional and cultural factors (which were also included into the first model) remains the same. The model demonstrates an essential nationalitybased character. In comparison with the other structural parameters, only the factor Education has a stable and significant influence on social expectations in most countries (except in Ukraine and Sweden): less educated people more strongly call for the social responsibility of governance.
Other structural factors manifested as significant in 1-3 countries. For example, the factor youth (18-25 years old) is more significant in the explanatory model in Poland and has weak significance in Great Britain. In contrast, in Sweden, being older (belonging to an older age group) better (but also weakly) explains social expectations concerning the welfare state. Theoretically, it was expected that there would be more significance given to having a personal social network (Reciprocity) in explaining social attitudes to welfare states in post-socialist countries with unstable welfare regimes. But, as a negative factor (decreasing expectations about social support from the state), it was significant for only two western countries -Great Britain and Germany. It is interesting that only in the post-Soviet countries (Ukraine and Russia) was more social support from the state expected by people who dwelled in less urban territories (City). The factor economic stratification (income) manifested its significance only in post-socialist countries. In Russia and in Ukraine people with lower incomes expect more social support. The Gender factor is significant only in Sweden and Poland where females manifest more desire for social support from governance.
Correspondingly, the models are found to be more influential for postsocialist Poland and Russia than for all the other countries, and the influence of the structural model is a little better than the class-specific one for all the countries under scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION AND POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
The empirical analyses of the three-dimensional space of social attitudes to welfare regime, as well as the causation model that explains the influence of a complex of factors on social attitudes, lead us to the following conclusions.
First, social attitudes to welfare regime and the social responsibility of a state for individual and family wellbeing manifest themselves clearly in the three-dimensional space of social expectations, assessments, and estimations. The 'three welfare regimes' theoretical model clearly describes the differences in attitudes between West European countries like Great Britain, Germany and Sweden. The corresponding tools (indicators and questions) used in ESS Round 4 are sensitive enough for measuring the empirical differences in these models.
Second, social attitudes to the welfare regime diverge significantly when examined using a country comparative perspective. The attitudes (in the analyzed variables) correspond to social macro-parameters of the social quality of societies and the welfare regime state of development. Two types of welfare regimes are distinguished: (1) welfare regimes historically embedded into capitalism, the market and civil society; and, (2) emerging welfare regimes under post-socialist transformation. The empirical analyses of social attitude profiles in Great Britain and Sweden indicate the correspondence with these profiles to the theoretical models of 'liberal' and 'social democratic' welfare regimes, respectively. However, the social attitude profile of Germany displays somewhat of a shift away from the expected 'continental' model toward a more liberal one. This indicates more liberal attitudes and a higher level of personal responsibility for individual and family wellbeing. One can assume that this empirical shift is the aftermath of the essential changes in social policy and welfare regime in Germany in the 2000s (Häusermann 2010; Butterwegge 2012) .
As was expected theoretically, the empirical profiles of social attitudes towards the welfare state in post-Socialist countries contain substantial mismatches. From the post-Socialist countries examined, only Polish society manifests clear correlation between the indicators of social attitudes and assessment; these indicators also suggest an 'inclination' towards a 'socialdemocratic' model of welfare regime. This conclusion does not agree with the placement of Poland in the 'welfare regimes map' developed by Ebbinghaus (2012) according to the institutional data for the regimes. One can assume that this inclination is a legacy of state socialism, and is also related to a decrease in the traumatic stress caused by the market transition in Poland in the 1990s due to appropriate social policy that allowed individuals to adapt better to new market institutions.
Social consciousness in post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian societies remains more dependent on the paternalistic values and attitudes which dominated late Soviet society. These paternalistic attitudes manifested themselves on a background of an undeveloped sense of individual responsibility and social activity, as well as on the inability of societies to foresee the negative consequences of the welfare state on economic development as well as on the moral and social cohesion of society. The social consciousness of the Ukrainians is rather paradoxical: the very high expectations for the welfare state are combined with the lowest (in a comparative perspective) assessments of the utility of social policy, as well as with the lowest trust in the state, governance and other public institutes. The social attitudes manifested in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia do not match those underlying any basic European welfare state models. Thus none of the models represented can be rooted in culture and social structure via social political reforms in the foreseeable future.
Thirdly, using the linear regression analysis an empirical model of institutional, cultural, and structural determinants of social attitudes to a welfare regime was justified. One can assert that the social attitudes and expectations of citizens depend essentially on individual interactions between the individual and policy institutes, as well as a social system as whole. The more positive the individual appraisal of the current system of social security and protection (in terms of education, health care and social support during unemployment) are, the lower the expectations for social support from governance. On the other hand, the greater the perceived risk of social policy, the lower the expectation for the social responsibility of governance.
The assumption that level of family income is the most influential factor in determining attitudes to the social responsibility of governance is not justified. Individuals earning an amount which places them in the first three (lowest) deciles of income (LowInc) are more liable to have greater social expectations only in post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Russia (in Ukraine this effect is more pronounced).
Stratification according to education (Educ) appeared as more or less significant factor in influencing social expectations. Ukraine is an exception where there is no effect of education on social attitudes to the welfare state. One can suppose that individuals of all levels of education in this country experience similar social risks and feel a more or less equal need for social support from the state.
The very high social expectations for a welfare state in combination with very low level of trust in public institutes, as well as a low assessment of the utility of a welfare state are paradoxical characteristics of the post-Soviet countries under study. It is especially in Ukraine that this paradox is most salient and indicates the catastrophic insufficiency of the social responsibility of governance. During the twenty years of post-Soviet development, this insufficiency of governance has not been compensated for by social policy or by the activity of any other agents of social responsibility (e.g. civil society or local communities). Under conditions of social, economic and moral crises in society and rapid changes in social structure and value systems, this weakness of the state leads increasingly to social alienation and produces a deep cleavage in interests between the governing actors and governing elites, on the one hand, and society as a whole, on the other.
One of the unexpected results of our analysis is that class belonging (the employer vs. employee distinction that reflects industrial social cleavage) has a rather low or even insignificant influence on social attitudes to the welfare state. One can assume that this finding reflects the reality of modern capitalism in which capitalists, employers and managers adjust to the welfare state, and the welfare state adjusts to them. Over time, national welfare states become an important part of the institutional matrix that shapes practices at the level of the firm and influences broader efforts at national economic management. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism it is obvious that employers' attitudes toward the welfare state will be more complex. This conclusion helps to explain why employers have often been more half-hearted and internally divided over welfare state than many theories of political economy might anticipate.
The popular thesis about social cleavages determining social attitudes is not justified in our study. In Great Britain, with its liberal welfare regime and long-term class-oriented social policy, structural factors empirically manifest themselves only weakly. Even in Sweden, where large-scale public sectors might be expected to generate such structural effects, we are forced to acknowledge that empirical support for the thesis is no more than modest. In an effort to determine if these hypothesized cleavages over the welfare state actually exist in public opinion, Svallfors concludes that public vs. privatesector employment does not seem to constitute a particularly important fault line (1997: 292; 2003) . Our analysis also confirms that the differences in social attitudes are seldom statistically significant; they point in different directions according to different indices, sometimes showing, for instance, that publicsector employees are more in favour of redistribution and smaller income gaps than private-sector employees, although it is sometimes the opposite.
In conclusion, let us note that our empirical analysis fixes its gaze on the very unsteady process of welfare development and on searching for fitter forms of social contracts in different types of European societies. PostSocialist states are special 'worlds' in the wide European space, in which the post-Soviet states are a quite distinct family (Castels & Obinger 2008: 321) of social systems and are constructing their own forms of social order. The development of better models of social responsibility that balance governance, market (family) and civil society using broad cross-class coalitions in support of major reform packages (Häusermann 2010 ) and successfully modify their models to meet the social expectations of a country is a challenge both for Western and Eastern European societies. However, it is sure that any such development will not be effective without the humanization of societies, the strengthening of trust in governance and public institutes, the strengthening of the social responsibility of public servants, and without the accumulation of positive interactions between citizens and the state.
